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IN-SOURCING CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR
ENFORCEMENT OF THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
Larry D. Thompson*
I. INTRODUCTION
The World Bank estimates that more than $1 trillion in bribes are paid each and
every year to government officials who demand that they be given something extra
simply for performing their public duties.' Bribery supplants the rule of law with
the rule of naked will-indeed, of naked greed-and turns many countries into
kleptocracies.2 In the words of former Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer,
"everyone-from the fruit stand owner in Tunisia, to the oil rig worker in Nigeria,
to the punk rock musician in Russia-knows how pernicious corruption can be;
and we in the United States are in a unique position to spread the gospel of
anti-corruption, because there is no country that enforces its anti-bribery laws
more vigorously than we do."3 Former U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan
characterizes bribery as 'an insidious plague that has a wide range of corrosive
effects on societies. It undermines democracy and the rule of law, leads to vio-
lations of human rights, distorts markets, erodes the quality of life, and allows
organized crime, terrorism, and other threats to human security to flourish."' 4
Public corruption "creates gaps in government structures that organized crim-
inal groups and terrorist networks can exploit. In short, corruption is a 'gateway
crime.'" 5 The problems of government and business corruption that are addressed
by the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA")6 therefore cannot be overstated.
* Former Deputy Attorney General of the United States (2001-2003). The views and opinions set forth in this
article are solely those of Mr. Thompson and not of any other person or organization. I am indebted to
Charles J. Cooper and Brian S. Koukoutchos of Cooper & Kirk, PLLC for their assistance on this article. @ 2014,
Larry D. Thompson.
1. Examining Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime and
Drugs of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 11Ith Cong. 4 (2010) [hereinafter Senate FCPA Hearing], http://www.
gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-1 Ishrg66921/pdf/CHRG-l ll shrg66921.pdf (statement of Greg Andres, Acting Deputy
Assistant Att'y Gen., Criminal Division).
2. See Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Remarks at the American Conference
Institute's 28th National Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 16, 2012) [hereinafter Breuer
2012 Address], http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2012/crm-speech- 1211161 .html.
3. Id. at 1; see also id. at 2 (discussing work and successes of DOJ's Kleptocracy Initiative in compelling
corrupt foreign leaders to forfeit ill-gotten gains that are located within U.S. jurisdiction).
4. Joseph W. Yockey, Solicitation, Extortion, and the FCPA, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 781, 826-27 & n.210
(2011); see also id. at 783 ("Bribery blights lives, undermines democracy, and distorts markets.").
5. Breuer 2012 Address, supra note 2, at 2.
6. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 et seq. (2012)).
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Compounding the problem of enforcing the FCPA is the daunting chasm be-
tween the size and complexity of global multinational corporations and the limited
resources that America's enforcement agencies, the Department of Justice ("DOJ")
and the Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC"), can bring to bear. The only
way to level the playing field, at least a bit, is to enlist the businesses themselves
in FCPA enforcement. That is, we must create an incentive structure that drives
corporations to establish internal compliance programs and to root out foreign
corruption within their own organizations. Only those businesses themselves have
the resources to conduct the global investigations that the FCPA requires.
To accomplish this end, I believe that we need to do two things: first, we must
give businesses clear and predictable guidance on what sort of compliance
programs they must establish; second, we must give them powerful incentives to
engage in self-investigation and self-reporting of the bribery they uncover or
suspect. The incentives I suggest are two: (1) businesses must be assured that a
strong compliance program and prompt and full self-disclosure will ensure that
the company itself will not be subject to criminal prosecution under the FCPA, and
(2) such self-disclosure will also prevent the company from being debarred from
doing business with the federal government or being denied government permits
or licenses necessary for the company's operations.
In this article I first review our nation's long-standing and active aversion to
corporate corruption overseas, as principally embodied in the FCPA. I then explain
how achievement of the FCPA's goals is undermined by the uncertainty in cur-
rent federal enforcement policies and the consequent ambivalence toward self-
disclosure exhibited by multinational corporations. Finally, I argue that the only
realistic way to make up the shortcomings in FCPA enforcement that flow from
the Justice Department's limited resources is to motivate corporations themselves
to police corruption in their foreign subsidiaries by giving them a concrete
incentive in the form of guaranteed immunity from corporate criminal liability, and
by assuring them that the company will not be debarred from doing business with
one of the largest of all potential clients-the United States government. This
proposed policy of inducing corporations to be responsible for policing themselves
in the public interest would be merely another instance of America's historical
practice of yoking the corporation to society's plough.
II. AMERICAN LEADERSHIP IN ADDRESSING FOREIGN CORRUPTION
Although enactment of the FCPA was driven largely by the American conviction
that "[c]orporate bribery is bad business,"7 subsequent international efforts to
suppress bribery have recognized that the threat goes beyond capitalism and
7. Yockey, supra note 4, at 828 (quoting S. REP. No. 95-114, at 4 (1977)).
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"jeopardizes 'sustainable development and the rule of law."' 8 As usual, the toxic
effects of any international problem are always most acute in the underdeveloped
portions of the world.
Corruption . .. has particularly negative effects on emerging economies. When
a developing country's public officials routinely abuse their power for personal
gain, its people suffer. At a concrete level, roads are not built, schools lie in ruin
and basic public services go unprovided. At a more abstract, but equally
important, level, political institutions lose legitimacy and people lose hope that
they will ever be able to improve their lot.9
"Companies that routinely engage in corrupt business practices abroad play an
active role in helping maintain the 'ungoverned states' that 'continue to export
poverty and serve as havens for all sorts of gangsters, pirates and terrorists."'"0
As long as there has been anything approximating organized government, there
have been apparatchiks with their hands held out, demanding that their palms be
greased before public services are provided or the public's work gets done. Yet for
more than two decades, the United States was alone in prohibiting the bribery of
the officials of other nations." The FCPA was enacted in 1977 in the wake of an
SEC report that more than 400 American companies-including many of the
largest corporations in the nation-had made more than $300 million in "ques-
tionable payments" to foreign officials with whom they were doing business. 12 At
the time, many foreign governments saw the FCPA as yet another pointless and
annoying instance of American economic imperialism, and widely dismissed
it as naive or even "quixotic."' 3 Indeed, in many nations, bribes paid to foreign
officials were tax-deductible as a routine business expense.' 4 But the rest of the
world slowly recognized that such corruption was bad for everyone's business: the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Convention on Combat-
ing Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions
("OECD Convention") was ratified and took effect on February 15, 1999.15 Other
8. Id. at 829 (quoting United Nations Convention Against Corruption, G.A. Res. 58/4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/4,
at pmbl. (Oct. 31, 2003)).
9. Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Remarks at the 26th National Conference
on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 1 (Nov. 8, 2011) [hereinafter Breuer 2011 Address], http://www.justice.gov/
criminal/pr/speeches/201 /crm-speech- Ill 108.html.
10. See Drury D. Stevenson & Nicholas J. Wagoner, FCPA Sanctions: Too Big to Debar?, 80 FORDHAM L. REv.
775, 780 (2011) (quoting Paul D. Carrington, Enforcing International Corrupt Practices Law, 32 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 129, 131 (2010)). For example, at least $1.7 million of the billion dollars that Siemens paid in bribes ended up
in the hands of Saddam Hussein. Id. at 780-81.
11. See Senate FCPA Hearing, supra note 1, at 81 (testimony of Michael Volkov).
12. Lillian V. Blageff, Guide to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, in 1 FOREIGN CORRUpr PRAcTIcEs Acr
REPORTER § 1.1 (2d ed. 2008).
13. Senate FCPA Hearing, supra note 1, at 81.
14. See Blageff, supra note 12, § 1.1.
15. Id.
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international efforts emerged from the Organization of American States, the
United Nations, and the World Bank.16
The Justice Department has recently made enforcement of the FCPA its top
priority-"second only to fighting terrorism."' 7 Between 2007 and 2009 the DOJ
and the SEC brought roughly twice as many FCPA cases as they had in the statute's
entire prior twenty-eight years of existence.' 8 And in 2010 there were more FCPA
prosecutions than ever before, with fines regularly topping hundreds of millions of
dollars.19 There are at least 200 FCPA investigations currently pending; plainly,
FCPA enforcement is at its zenith and is unlikely to diminish in the foreseeable
future. 2 0 Last year former Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer gave a speech
lauding the Justice Department's FCPA docket-more trials than in any year in the
history of the Act-and the fact that the DOJ had just secured the longest prison
sentence-fifteen years-ever imposed under the FCPA.2'
Thus, FCPA enforcement has been nearing a fever pitch and nine-figure
penalties are no longer novelties. 22 For example, in December 2008, Siemens AG
and several subsidiaries pled guilty to FCPA crimes and paid a total of $1.6 billion
in fines to the U.S. and German governments for a scheme that involved more than
$1.3 billion in bribes or other improper payments in at least ten different
countries.23 To put that $1.6 billion fine in perspective, the highest previous FCPA
sanction had been $44 million.24 In March 2010, BAE Systems plc, one of the
world's largest defense contractors, entered a guilty plea under the FCPA and paid
a $400 million criminal fine to the United States and a fine of $50 million to the
United Kingdom's Serious Fraud Office on charges involving corrupt arms
trafficking to Saudi Arabia.2 5 The following month, Daimler AG and its Chinese,
Russian, and German national subsidiaries paid $185 million to settle FCPA
charges involving payoffs in twenty-two countries-about half of that sum in
criminal fines to the DOJ and half in disgorgement of profits to the SEC.26
In February of 2009, Kellogg Brown & Root LLC-the engineering subsidiary
that Halliburton spun off in the wake of its prolonged and unwelcome time in the
public spotlight-settled charges (involving allegations of a decade of bribing
16. Id.
17. Yockey, supra note 4, at 782 & n.2.
18. Id. at 783 n.3.
19. Id. at 783.
20. Id. at 783 & n.6.
21. See Breuer 2011 Address, supra note 9, at 1.
22. Yockey, supra note 4, at 783.
23. Robert W. Tarun & Peter P. Tomczak, A Proposal for a United States Department of Justice Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act Leniency Policy, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 153, 223 (2010); Yockey, supra note 4, at 791.
24. Yockey, supra note 4, at 791.
25. Tarun & Tomczak, supra note 23, at 226.
26. Id. at 227-28, 233.
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Nigerian officials to garner $6 billion in construction contracts) with DOJ and SEC
for $579 million.2 7
In 2010, the OECD officially congratulated the United States for investigating
and prosecuting more foreign bribery cases than any other signatory to the OECD
28Convention. And companies are not the only targets. Lanny Breuer, former chief
of DOJ's Criminal Division, announced in November of 2011 that his office's
admirable Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Initiative had filed complaints seeking
forfeiture of $70 million from Teodoro Nguema Obiang Mangue, a minister for
Equatorial Guinea and son of that nation's president.29 It is little wonder that the
FCPA has become perhaps "the most ... feared statute[] for companies operating
abroad." 3 0
III. THE FCPA Is UNDERMINED BY THE ABIDING UNCERTAINTY AND OPACITY OF
U.S. ENFORCEMENT PRACTICES
Despite this account of recent vigorous enforcement, my view is that the
statute is feared less because of what is known about the FCPA's power and the
DOJ's zeal to enforce it, than because of what is unknown about the scope of the
FCPA's prohibitions and how, when, and where the DOJ and SEC will choose to
apply them. "Companies depend on predictability in the law so that they can
clearly articulate for firm employees and agents how compliance is to be accom-
plished and engage in efficient business planning." 31 As a consequence, although
some companies with bribery schemes led by their CEOs, like Halliburton, will
(and should) see (and fear) the Justice Department coming, for many companies
operating abroad the FCPA strikes with the ferocity and unpredictability of a
tornado.3 2 The uncertainty of precisely what the FCPA forbids and allows harbors
frightening potential for prosecutorial abuse and over-criminalization-topics that
have preoccupied me, both as a private attorney and as Deputy Attorney General of
the United States, for many years. 3 3
This uncertainty in the FCPA is particularly troubling when one is dealing not
just with individuals, who have control over all their own actions, but also with
27. Yockey, supra note 4, at 791; Tarun & Tomczak, supra note 23, at 225. KBR's former president and CEO,
Albert Jack Stanley, also pled guilty and was sentenced to seven years in prison. Tarun & Tomczak, supra note 23,
at 225.
28. Senate FCPA Hearing, supra note 1, at 4 (statement of Greg Andres, Acting Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen.,
Criminal Division).
29. See Breuer 2011 Address, supra note 9, at 3. Somehow, Mr. Obiang had amassed a fortune of $100 million
on his government salary of less than $100,000 per year. Id.
30. Yockey, supra note 4, at 781.
31. Id. at 823.
32. See Former Chairman and CEO of Kellogg, Brown & Root Inc. Sentenced to 30 Months in Prison for
Foreign Bribery and Kickback Schemes, U.S. DEP'T JUSTICE (Feb. 23, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/opalpr/2012/
February/12-crm-249.html.
33. See generally Larry D. Thompson, Keynote Speech: The Reality of Overcriminalization, 7 J.L. EcoN. &
Pot'Y 577 (2011).
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large corporations-artificial "persons" consisting of hundreds, or thousands, or
even hundreds of thousands, of individuals for whom the corporation can be held
accountable. With mere indictment, let alone conviction, capable of being a death
sentence for a business entity-as we learned with Arthur Andersen and Drexel
Burnham 34-this is very serious business. In fact, even the mere announcement of
an FCPA criminal investigation casts a shadow on the corporation and the efficacy
of its governing processes. Once upon a time, it was universally accepted that
corporations could not be subjected to the criminal law because they were an
artifice of man and had neither a conscience nor a soul.36 In the 17th century, Lord
Coke opined that a corporation's existence "rests only in intendment and consider-
ation of the law."37 Two centuries later, Mr. Chief Justice Marshall added that the
corporation is a mere legal device, "an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and
existing only in contemplation of law."3 8
The application of criminal law to corporations has always struck me as
profoundly misguided, but as I have written elsewhere, that train left the station
long ago with the decision in New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Co. v.
United States.39 Sometimes we gaze upon centuries-old precedents, like Marbury
v. Madison,40 with veneration, but on other occasions ancient precedents look less
like the distillation of the wisdom of the ages than an aberration where, by dint of
syllogisms and sophistry, otherwise sound minds have learnedly deceived them-
selves. The Supreme Court's reflexive extension of the doctrine of respondeat
superior from tort law to the criminal law in New York Central is redolent of the
medieval era when the law barely-if at all-distinguished between civil torts and
crimes, both of which were punishable by amercements (arbitrary fines) payable to
the Crown.4 1 But there are some indications that the Supreme Court may be
34. See Scott Horsely, Enron and the Fall of Arthur Andersen, NPR (May 26, 2006, 4:00 PM), http://
www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyid= 5435092; The Collapse ofDrexel Burnham Lambert; Key Events
for Drexel Burnham Lambert, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 1990), http://www.nytimes.com/1990/02/14/business/the-
collapse-of-drexel-bumham-lambert-key-events-for-drexel-burnham-lambert.html.
35. Thompson, Keynote Speech: The Reality of Overcriminalization, supra note 33, at 581.
36. See The Case of Sutton's Hospital, (1612) 77 Eng. Rep. 960 (K.B.) 973 ("[Corporations] cannot commit
treason, nor be outlawed, nor excommunicate, for they have no souls .....
37. Id.
38. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819).
39. 212 U.S. 481 (1909). For a discussion of the case, see Larry D. Thompson, The Blameless Corporation,
47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1251, 1252 (2010).
40. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
41. Compare New York Central, 212 U.S. at 493-95 (explaining, almost casually, the extension of tort doctrine
to the criminal law), with Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 269-70 & nn.11-14
(1989) (discussing early English common-law of amercements and how they were used to redress "civil" wrongs
against the King and "against defendants who today would be liable in tort"); see also 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK &
FREDERIC MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD 1519 (2d ed. 1905) (discussing
how amercements were used against both criminal offenses and civil wrongs); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277,
284 n.8 (1983) (observing an amercement "was the most common criminal sanction in 13th-century England");
WILLIAM McKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA 285-86 (2d ed. 1914) (discussing amercements as a step in the development
of criminal law).
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reaching the outer limits of its willingness to automatically impute an employee's
individual criminal liability to a corporate employer.42
Unfortunately, the Justice Department's FCPA enforcement policy shows no
signs of a similar evolutionary trajectory. Although the DOJ continues to say that
it "encourages ... corporate self-policing, including voluntary disclosures to the
government of any problems that a corporation discovers on its own," it simul-
taneously warns that "the existence of a compliance program is not sufficient, in
and of itself, to justify not charging a corporation for criminal misconduct
undertaken by its officers, directors, employees or agents." 4 3 "The existence of
a corporate compliance program, even one that specifically prohibited the very
conduct in question, does not absolve the corporation from criminal liabil-
ity . . . ."" Indeed, the Justice Department concedes that it provides no guidelines
or requirements for what constitutes an acceptable compliance program,45 nor
does DOJ offer clear guidance about the benefits to a corporation for doing the
right thing.46 Unfortunately (and rather remarkably), despite the intricacies of the
myriad ways in which one can run afoul of the FCPA, and despite an attempt to
provide some general guidance as to how the federal government would enforce
the criminal law with respect to crimes committed by a corporation, the Justice
Department has never issued any implementing regulations for the FCPA.48
Indeed, for a long time the DOJ largely ignored all pleas, from whatever
source, that it issue guidance on how it would enforce the FCPA and how
corporations could protect and internally police themselves with compliance
programs. 4 9 Despite the urging of both Congress and the federal Courts of
Appeals 50-not to mention the OECD 5'-the DOJ failed to provide meaningful
42. See Thompson, Keynote Speech: The Reality of Overcriminalization, supra note 33, at 579-80 (discussing,
inter alia, Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998), and Kolstad v. Am. DentalAss'n, 527 U.S. 526
(1999)).
43. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATrORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-28.800(A) (2008), available at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading-room/usam/title9/28mcrm.htm#9-28.800.
44. Id. § 9-28.800(B) (emphasis added).
45. Id.
46. ETHics RES. CTR., THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES FOR ORGANIZATIONS AT TWENTY YEARS 61 (2012),
available at http://www.ethics.org/files/u5/fsgo-report2Ol2.pdf ("Government officials have been exclaiming the
importance of ECEPs in much the same way that parents urge kids to eat vegetables-'they are good for you.'
This does not mean that the agencies for which these officials work are necessarily following the second part of
the typical parental message; the part that offers an incentive-'and if you do, you will get dessert."').
47. Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Heads of
Dep't Components & U.S. Attorneys (Jan. 20, 2003), http://www.albany.edulacc/courses/acc695spring2008/
thompson%20memo.pdf.
48. Blageff, supra note 12, § 1.1.
49. See Tarun & Tomczak, supra note 23, at 156-57, 165, 172, 204; Mike Koehler, Grading the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act Guidance, 7 WHITE COLLAR CRIME REP. (BNA) 961, 961-62 (2012).
50. See Koehler, supra note 49, at 961 (discussing congressional 1988 amendments to the FCPA and the Sixth
Circuit's decision in Lamb v. Philip Morris, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024, 1029 (6th Cir. 1990)).
51. See id. at 962 (discussing the conclusion of the OECD's official Phase Two Report on U.S. Enforcement
under the OECD Convention that the FCPA suffered from the lack of official guidance on compliance "with the
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guidance on the FCPA and left corporations to speculate about the benefits of
establishing compliance programs and self-reporting violations of such internal
controls. It was somewhat embarrassing for the United States, which after all had
pioneered international law enforcement against bribery in 1977,52 to be lectured
in 2002 by the OECD on the obvious proposition that official guidance would
"provide a valuable risk management tool to guide companies through some of the
pitfalls which might arise" in international commercial transactions.5 3
In 2010, even greater dismay greeted the DOJ's unfortunate dismissal of the
Senate's request for FCPA guidance, particularly as to what constitutes an
adequate compliance program, or where the DOJ fixes the threshold for initiating
an investigation of "any little conduct" or prosecuting "relatively minor things"
where companies are not even "sure if it is a gray area or not." 54 Senator
Klobuchar stated that she had heard from many corporate executives that they
were "so afraid of what is going to happen if they disclose for minor things" that
they "cannot sleep at night because they are worrying about this."
This is not an academic point: the FCPA has neither a materiality requirement
for what constitutes a corrupt practice nor a de minimis exception, so a $10 meal
consisting of a cheeseburger, fries and a soda could easily suffice.56 One firm
recently disclosed that it had spent $3.2 million to investigate $50,000 of
"potentially" improper payments made by one of its minor foreign branches that
twenty-five-year old statute"); United States: OECD Recognizes Anti-Bribery Enforcement and Recommends
Enhancements, ORG. FOR EcoN. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (Oct. 20, 2010), http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/
unitedstatesoecdrecognisesanti-briberyenforcementandrecommendsenhancements.htm (urging the U.S. to "con-
solidat[e] publicly available information on the application of the FCPA" and "[t]o increase transparency, making
public, where appropriate, more information on the use of Non-Prosecution Agreements (NPAs) and Deferred
Prosecution Agreements (DPAs) in specific cases").
52. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL Div., & THE U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N, ENFORCEMENT Div., FCPA: A
RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 3 (2012) [hereafter FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE]
(explaining how the OECD Convention arose from a congressional request in 1988 that the President negotiate an
international treaty with OECD countries to augment the FCPA).
53. Koehler, supra note 49, at 962 (quoting the OECD Phase Two Report). In its formal response in 2002 to the
OECD's inquiries concerning Phase 2 of the implementation of the OECD Convention, the DOJ conceded that it
had not issued any guidance for compliance with the FCPA or the OECD Convention, although it had established
a procedure through which companies could obtain advisory opinions on FCPA compliance. See U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, RESPONSE OF THE UNITED STATES QUESTIONS CONCERNING PHASE 2 1 A.3.2, B.2, available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/response2.pdf (last visited Nov. 25, 2013). Similarly, in its 2010
review, the OECD commended the United States for its enforcement efforts, but repeated its recommendation-
which had gone unheeded in the intervening eight years-that the Justice Department formulate and publish
comprehensive guidance on FCPA enforcement. See United States: OECD Recognizes Anti-Bribery Enforcement
and Recommends Enhancements, supra note 51.
54. Senate FCPA Hearing, supra note 1, at 6-7, 11-12. Unfortunately, in 2010 the DOJ defended the lack of
authoritative FCPA guidance by listing the same general materials that the OECD had originally determined to be
inadequate in 2002. See Koehler, supra note 49, at 962 & n. 10.
55. Senate FCPA Hearing, supra note 1, at 6-7 (recounting that she had "heard from many very good standing
companies in [her] State that they do not always know what behavior will trigger an enforcement action," and
asking how that could possibly comport with "the basic principles of due process").
56. Id. at 21 (testimony of Andrew Weissmann, on behalf of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce).
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accounted for about one-half of one percent of the company's total annual
revenue.5 7 Those costs of course fall on the shareholders, and the activity itself
disrupts operations and distracts the company from business opportunities. 8 The
problem is not that corporations are extraordinarily or unreasonably risk-averse.
Rather, it is that there is so much uncertainty in FCPA enforcement that the risk
cannot even be intelligently evaluated.5 9 Thus, the uncertainty of the FCPA spawns
massive and extraordinarily unfocused over-compliance, "includ[ing] mundane
matters like companies engaging high-priced lawyers to analyze FCPA compliance
risk for inviting certain foreign customers to trade shows, company golf outings, or
providing various cultural versions of fruit baskets during holidays."6 o Yet at the
2010 Senate Hearing, the DOJ opposed even a rebuttable presumption that a small
business dinner did not constitute a criminal bribe.6 1 One aspect of the uncertainty
surrounding FCPA enforcement, therefore, is the lack of clear guidance on just
what behavior would constitute a forbidden "corrupt practice."
Another element of uncertainty arises from the lack of clarity on what com-
panies can reasonably and realistically be expected to do to prevent (or, if they
occur, to uncover, report and redress) corrupt practices by their employees. At
the same Senate hearing discussed above, one witness urged the adoption of a
"compliance program" affirmative defense, such as that contained in the U.K.
statute,62 which mandates consideration by the court of the defendant company's
compliance program and whether the offending employee had evaded it. 6 3 Another
witness doubted that this would provide useful guidance, pointing out that an
affirmative defense typically is not presented until there has been an indictment
and perhaps even a trial, yet we know from the Arthur Andersen case that a
criminal indictment can put the company's very existence in jeopardy and cause
the loss of thousands of jobs.64 What is needed is DOJ guidance in advance so that
57. Yockey, supra note 4, at 823-24 & n.200.
58. Id. at 824. A Dow Jones survey reported that fifty-one percent of companies have delayed, and fourteen
percent have cancelled, business ventures abroad due to uncertainty about FCPA enforcement. Id. at 824 & n.203;
see also Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Sec. of
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 37 (2011) [hereinafter House FCPA Hearing] (testimony of George J.
Terwilliger) (the "hidden effect is the cost imposed on our economic growth when companies forgo business
opportunity out of concern for FCPA compliance risk. This hurts the creation of jobs and the ability of U.S.
companies to compete with companies elsewhere that do not have to concern themselves with uncertainties of the
terms and requirements of the FCPA").
59. See House FCPA Hearing, supra note 58, at 37 (testimony of George J. Terwilliger) ("When faced with
that uncertainty, companies sometimes forgo deals they could otherwise do, take a pass on contemplated projects,
or withdraw from ongoing projects and ventures. Companies making such decisions are not doing so because they
are generally risk-averse. They are doing so by the simple reasoning that the risk of non-compliance, as defined by
the statute and those charged with its enforcement, cannot be calculated with sufficient certainty.").
60. Senate FCPA Hearing, supra note 1, at 61 (prepared statement of Professor Mike Koehler).
61. Id. at 30-31 (formal written responses by the DOJ to Questions for the Record by Sen. Amy Klobuchar).
62. Bribery Act, 2010, c.23 (U.K.).
63. Senate FCPA Hearing, supra note 1, at 15 (statement of Andrew Weissmann).
64. Id. at 23 (statement of Michael Volkov).
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a corporation can set up a compliance program that will both prevent misconduct
by employees and shield the corporation from criminal indictment if the program
is circumvented by individuals who ignore the corporation's training and com-
pliance efforts. 6 5 The Justice Department could provide such guidance today-it
requires no further authorizing legislation from Congress.6 6
I do not propose that any corporation found to have violated the FCPA
necessarily receive credit for merely establishing an internal compliance program
if, in a given incident, that program was clearly inadequate. Without regard to the
question of the corporation's good faith in instituting an internal compliance
regime, an anti-corruption program that fails to actually root out corruption is of no
benefit to the wider society. Rewarding a corporation with reduced penalties for
simply instituting some sort of compliance program that in fact failed to ensure
compliance would give companies a perverse incentive to merely go through the
motions.
That said, we must be realistic about what can be accomplished by even the
most dedicated corporate managers. Not even a police state can ferret out every
crime, let alone prevent all crimes in the first instance. Likewise, no multinational
corporation with thousands of employees in dozens of countries around the globe
can be expected to detect and punish every employee act that suborns the integrity
of a foreign government official, let alone to prevent every such act of corruption
in advance. But, just as there are rules about compliance programs in investment
firms and mortgage firms, minimum standards and guidelines for an acceptable
and effective FCPA compliance program can be formulated and promulgated by
the government. A company that implements them should be guaranteed some
level of credit in the legal process-some set scale of discounts-for doing so,
even if some employee somewhere manages to evade the compliance regime. If
the company that employs that malefactor itself uncovers the wrongdoing and
punishes and reports the wrongdoer, the company should be guaranteed that the
corporation qua corporation will not become a criminal defendant, and that the
company will not be barred from doing business with the U.S. federal government.
The Justice Department's formal, written response to this onslaught of criticism
was to suggest that any corporation in need of guidance could (1) formally seek an
advisory opinion and (2) refer to the Department's "Lay Person's Guide to the
FCPA," available at the DOJ website.67 The Department also recommended that
companies study more than a hundred summaries of non-prosecution agreements
("NPAs") and deferred prosecution agreements ("DPAs") compiled at the DOJ
65. See id.
66. Id. at 24.
67. Id. at 27 (formal written responses by the DOJ to Questions for the Record by Sen. Christopher A. Coons).
Mr. Andres from the DOJ also suggested that, to divine compliance and enforcement standards under the
congressional FCPA, companies should study the "good practice" guidance issued by the OECD under its
Convention. Id. at 7. It is unclear from the context if Mr. Andres intended this as a joke.
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website. 8 Yet the former head of FCPA enforcement himself has explained that
those NPAs and DPAs are part of the problem. Mark Mendelsohn, who was the
Deputy Chief of the DOJ Fraud Section and the person "responsible for overseeing
all DOJ investigations and prosecutions under the FCPA" from 2005 to 2010,69
stated in an interview that the "'danger"' posed by NPAs and DPAs "'is that it is
tempting"' for Justice Department attorneys "'to seek to resolve cases through
DPAs or NPAs that don't actually constitute violations of the law."' 7 0 Thus, the
FCPA guidance currently offered by the Justice Department is less helpful because
it may include coerced settlements that record instances where even DOJ itself was
not sure that a violation of the FCPA actually occurred.
The Justice Department was adamant first, that it had absolutely no interest in
even considering a self-disclosure amnesty or immunity program to incentivize
corporations to self-police and self-report,7 2 and second, that it opposed any sort of
formal compliance defense to the FCPA. Senator Klobuchar told Deputy
Assistant Attorney General Andres of the Justice Department's Criminal Division
that although "I know you believe there is enough guidance for [U.S. corpora-
tions,] I do not think that they think that there is." 7 4
The idea that clear guidance and concrete rewards are necessary to incentivize
corporations to self-police and self-report would not appear to be a difficult notion
to grasp. Former Federal Judge Stanley Sporkin, who is sometimes referred to as
"the father of the FCPA," is intimately familiar with foreign corruption from his
years as General Counsel of the CIA and during his twenty years in the SEC's
enforcement division he was certainly "no shrinking violet when it [came] to
enforcement matters."7 But Judge Sporkin understands that without both clear
guidance and assured benefits for self-reporting, there is no incentive for a
company to police itself vigorously. Judge Sporkin has proposed a model system
under which a participating company, in association with a major accounting firm
or law firm, conducts an internal FCPA review for the previous five years; the
company further agrees to disclose the results to the DOJ, the SEC, its investors,
and the public.7 6 If any irregularities are found, the company would commit to
68. Id. at 27 (formal written responses by the DOJ to Questions for the Record by Sen. Christopher A. Coons).
69. Id. at 57 (prepared testimony of Professor Mike Koehler).
70. Id. at 60 (quoting Mark Mendelsohn on the Rise of FCPA Enforcement, 24 CoRP. CRIME REP., no. 35,
Sept. 10, 2010, http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/mendelsohnO91010.htm).
71. When asked directly what would happen if the DOJ could not do NPAs or DPAs but could choose only
between bringing an indictment or not, Mr. Mendelsohn stated that the DOJ "would certainly bring fewer cases."
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 60-61 (prepared statement of Professor Mike Koehler)
(describing statements by other FCPA enforcement attorneys that the DOJ was pushing the statute far beyond
anything Congress envisioned when it enacted the law).
72. Id. at 8 (statement of Greg Andres, Acting Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen. of the United States).
73. Id. at 26 (formal written responses by the DOJ to Questions for the Record by Sen. Christopher A. Coons).
74. Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
75. Id. at 17 (statement of Michael Volkov).
76. Id. (outlining and discussing Sporkin model).
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eliminating them and imposing new necessary controls and then retain an FCPA
monitor for five years to certify annually that the company was in compli-
ance.77 Under those conditions, the SEC and the DOJ would agree not to bring an
enforcement action against the company except in truly egregious cases where the
company's business was built on bribery, rather than bribery being an anomaly in a
company that was trying in good faith to abide by the FCPA." Whether Judge
Sporkin's model is adopted or some other criteria are proposed, the two keys to
incentivizing corporations to police and self-report are clear guidance on what the
government expects from a compliance program and the government's unambigu-
ous assurance to the company that rigorous adherence to such a program will be
rewarded with a decision not to prosecute the corporation criminally.
It was apparent during the 2010 Senate Hearing that the DOJ was unperturbed
by the uncertainty surrounding FCPA enforcement. Indeed, one could be forgiven
for suspecting that at least some federal prosecutors favor that uncertainty.79 But
we must never forget that uncertainty in the law is the antithesis of the rule of law.
There is a reason that the Latin word for "uncertainty" is arbitrarius.80 That some
FCPA enforcement attorneys might relish and exploit the arbitrary enforcement of
a federal criminal statute is not merely unseemly-it is illegitimate. The most
fundamental of the legal protections in the Magna Carta-and just about the only
fragment of it that has not been repealed in the eight centuries since it was written
at Runnymede-is that which provides that "[n]o free man shall be seized or
imprisoned, or stripped of his rights or possessions, ... except by . . . the law of
the land."8 As Justice Hugo Black memorably explained:
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Although it pains me, as a former U.S. Deputy Attorney General, to acknowledge that there are some
prosecutors who are "stupid, malevolent, or a cowboy or cowgirl who just wants to try a case and does not want to
be reasonable," that is surely the case. Thompson, The Blameless Corporation, supra note 39, at 1254; see also
Thompson, Keynote Speech: The Reality of Overcriminalization, supra note 33, at 582 ("While I believe that most
government officials are fair and high-minded in making these sorts of determinations [to prosecute], there are
forces at work that can create a temptation for even the most sensible of these prosecutors to deviate sometimes"
and there will always be some who wish to "make names for themselves through highly publicized prosecu-
tions"). There is another pernicious incentive at work in this newly thriving anti-bribery complex: in the words of
the man who headed the FCPA enforcement office during the 1980s, ramped-up FCPA enforcement in the last
few years has been "'good business for law firms, good business for accounting firms, good business for
consulting firms, and DOJ lawyers who create the marketplace and then get a job"' when they exit the revolving
doors for which Washington's legal culture is so well known. See Senate FCPA Hearing, supra note 1, at 61
(prepared statement of Professor Mike Koehler) (quoting Nathan Vardi, The Bribery Racket, FORBES (June 7,
2010), http://www.forbes.com/global/2010/0607/companies-payoffs-washington-extortion-mendelsohn-bribery-
racket.html). I want to stress that these problems afflict only a very small minority of federal prosecutors, but
unfortunately it only takes one bad apple in one big prosecution to have a significant, deleterious effect on the
justice system.
80. See CASSELL's NEW COMPAcr LATIN DICTIONARY 19 (1963).
81. CLAIRE BREAY, MAGNA CARTA: MANUSCRIFTS AND MYTHS 52 (2002) (translating Article 39); see also id. at
48 ("Almost the whole of the 1225 version of Magna Carta ... has since been repealed, as the aspects of medieval
land tenure, taxation and administration which it sought to regulate have become obsolete. Only three clauses
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The origin of the Due Process Clause is Chapter 39 of Magna Carta, which
declares that "No free man shall be taken, outlawed, banished, or in any way
destroyed, nor will We proceed against or prosecute him, except by the lawful
judgment of his peers and by the law of the land." As early as 1354 the words
"due process of law" were used in an English statute interpreting Magna
Carta, and by the end of the 14th century "due process of law" and "law of the
land" were interchangeable. Thus the origin of this clause was an attempt by
those who wrote Magna Carta to do away with the so-called trials of that
period where people were liable to sudden arrest and summary conviction in
courts and by judicial commissions with no sure and definite procedural
protections and under laws that might have been improvised to try their
particular cases. Chapter 39 of Magna Carta was a guarantee that the
government would take neither life, liberty, nor property without a trial in
accord with the law of the land that already existed at the time the alleged
offense was committed. This means that the Due Process Clause gives all
Americans, whoever they are and wherever they happen to be, the right to be
tried by independent and unprejudiced courts using established procedures and
applying valid pre-existing laws.82
The principle that one could be prosecuted only under a known, non-
improvised, and existing statute was so fundamental to the Framers that it is one
of the very few rights specified in the original Constitution-in the Ex Post Facto
Clause of Article I, sec. 98 3-rather than added in the subsequent Bill of Rights.
IV. THE DOJ's BELATED RELEASE OF FCPA GUIDANCE FALLS SHORT
Finally, in November of 2011 the Justice Department relented and then-
Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer announced that the DOJ would be
issuing FCPA guidance.84 A year later, just after the election, on November 16,
2012, the DOJ and the SEC released FCPA: A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA Resource Guide").8 5 Its 130 pages appear impres-
sive at first glance, but about two-thirds of that is routine recitation of background
information: the introduction and table of contents consume thirty-five pages, the
reprinting of the statute itself accounts for another thirty pages, and a summary of
previously issued (and by definition inadequate) guidance and discussion of other
statutes fleshes out yet another twenty pages. Furthermore, the reliability of the
remain law ... [and] the most important clause which remains unrepealed is the most famous of all: it provides
the safeguard of the judgment of one's equals and the law of the land as protection for free men from arbitrary
imprisonment....").
82. Duncan v. State of La., 391 U.S. 145, 169 (1968) (Black, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (quoting Den
ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 275-76 (1855)).
83. "No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed." U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 9, cl. 3.
84. Koehler, supra note 49, at 962.
85. FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 52.
86. Koebler, supra note 49, at 962.
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FCPA Resource Guide is eviscerated by the disclaimer that appears on the very
first page: This guide
[I]s non-binding, informal and summary in nature, and the information con-
tained herein does not constitute rules or regulations. As such, it is not intended
to, does not, and may not be relied upon to create any rights, substantive or
procedural, that are enforceable at law by any party, in any criminal, civil, or
administrative matter.. . .It does not in any way limit the enforcement
intentions or litigating positions of the U.S. Department of Justice, the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission, or any other U.S. government agency.8 7
Indeed, at the press conference called to announce the FCPA Resource Guide,
Mr. Breuer disclaimed the presence of any new guidance in the document, insisting
that it "'does not represent a change in policy."'" To be fair, the examples of prior
enforcement actions and their surrounding circumstances that are provided in the
guidance will no doubt be of some assistance to companies confronting those same
factual scenarios in the future. Yet Steven Tyrrell, a former chief of the DOJ Fraud
Section during a period of escalating FCPA enforcement, has dismissed the FCPA
Resource Guide as "'more of a scrapbook of past DOJ and SEC successes than a
guidebook for companies who care about playing by the rules."' 89 So, not much of
a "resource" after all.
Moreover, the accuracy and comprehensiveness of the DOJ's description of its
past prosecutions, which are critical to the utility of the guidance, are very much in
doubt, given the FCPA Resource Guide's acknowledgment, in one of its final
footnotes, that for thirty years the DOJ has agreed to DPAs that were never filed
with any court-a practice that the DOJ now says it has abandoned. 90
Given the almost wooden attitude of the Justice Department and the SEC, it is
little wonder that companies who want to play by the rules find themselves in such
a quandary:
[C]orporations that must decide whether to report voluntarily bribery con-
duct confront considerable uncertainty as to the benefits (in the form of
reduced sanctions) of self-reporting and cooperation. While self-reporting
corrupt payment activities results in indeterminate benefits, it does assure that
law enforcement will know of the misconduct and, thus, in many instances,
some sanction will be imposed. Whether a corporation should undertake a
costly internal investigation, self-report its employees' or agents' FCPA bribery
87. FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 52 (providing an explanation, prior to the beginning of the guide, on
what the guide is intended to provide to businesses and individuals regarding the FCPA).
88. Koehler, supra note 49, at 963 (quoting The Guidance Press Conference, FCPA PROFESSOR, (Nov. 15,
2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/the-guidance-pressconference).
89. Id. at 964 (quoting Joe Palazzolo & Christopher M. Matthews, U.S. Attempts to Clarify Antibribery Law,
WALL ST. J., (Nov. 14, 2012), http://online.ws).com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324735104578118850
18143422).
90. FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 52, at 118 n.379.
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conduct and cooperate fully with law enforcement is a highly contextual
decision that is not invariably answered in the affirmative. 9 1
V. THE DOJ UNFORTUNATELY LACKS THE RESOURCES To ADEQUATELY
ENFORCE THE FCPA AND THE ONLY SOLUTION Is To INDUCE
CORPORATIONS To POLICE THEMSELVES
The best face that can be put on the situation is that the Justice Department
itself does not understand its own need to provide meaningful guidance to help
well-intentioned, would-be law-abiding corporations navigate the FCPA mine-
field. The Justice Department and the SEC have displayed great confidence in their
abilities as they have ramped up FCPA enforcement in the last four years. They
survey the landscape and see billions of dollars in penalties collected and profits
disgorged; they see multinational corporations haunted by the fear of the DOJ's
Fraud Section turning an inquiring eye in their direction.
But this supposedly shining vision of FCPA enforcement prowess is a Potemkin
village, because without corporations' own internal policing and self-reporting, the
FCPA can accomplish little.92 The best illustration of this fact is the DOJ's favorite
success story, trotted out in every congressional hearing and press release: Siemens
AG.93 This is the FCPA's crowning achievement: the parent company agreed to
pay a $448.5 million fine and three of Siemens' national subsidiaries each paid
an additional $500,000 fine, for a total payment to the DOJ of $450 million.9 4
The case involved a six-year scheme, conducted in ten different nations, under
which Siemens made $1.36 billion in illegal payments, including $805.5 million in
bribes to foreign government officials, another $554.5 million for "unknown" but
presumably nefarious purposes, and finally $341 million in direct payments to
business agents and consultants for undisclosed purposes.
But the Justice Department and the SEC did not root out all of this corruption by
themselves. Transnational FCPA cases are among the most labor-intensive to
investigate and among the hardest to prove.96 There are a multitude of dedicated,
diligent, skilled professionals at the DOJ and the SEC, but they do not come close
to having the resources to investigate a sprawling global conglomerate like
Siemens AG.97 After German authorities conducted an initial raid at a Siemens
office in Munich, it was Siemens itself that orchestrated and funded a gigantic
91. Tarun & Tomczak, supra note 23, at 154-155.
92. See Thompson, The Blameless Corporation, supra note 39, at 1255 ("We do not have enough FBI agents or
SEC examiners to monitor all the instances of corporate wrongdoing that may be out there, so we must incent
corporations to control and monitor their employees themselves through effective compliance programs.").
93. See, e.g., Senate FCPA Hearing, supra note 1, at 9, 50, 53, 62-63 & n.31.
94. Tarun & Tomczak, supra note 23, at 223.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 156 n.17.
97. See id. at 215.
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internal investigation, undoubtedly because it had to.9 8 Its global investigation
involved thirty-four countries, 1,750 interviews, 800 high-level meetings, 1.5
million billable hours by accountants and lawyers, and the production and review
of 167 million documents-all at a cost to Siemens (not to the DOJ or the SEC) of
$1 billion.99 That billion-dollar price tag does not include the costs attributable to
the disruption of Siemens' business or its loss of other opportunities. Nor does it
include the FCPA compliance monitor that Siemens agreed to pay for at a cost of
$52 million over four years. 00 Bear in mind that this is what a global investigation
cost Siemens itself, which could be expected to be intimately familiar with its own
far-flung operations. Overworked, outside investigators from the Justice Depart-
ment would likely have spent most of their time studying cryptic organizational
charts or loitering in myriad, fungible office building lobbies in three dozen
different countries-haggard, jet-lagged and waiting for a ride to their hotel or
their next meeting.
So what did Siemens get in exchange for its billion-dollar internal audit and the
$450 million in fines it paid to the DOJ? The Justice Department applauded
Siemens' cooperation as extraordinary and advertised that it rewarded Siemens
with an FCPA civil penalty 67% lower than Siemens would have paid if the DOJ
had itself uncovered the corruption instead.10 1 Of course, due to the limits of the
DOJ's enforcement resources, that is a very big "if." Moreover, the government's
arithmetic is off. It counts the $450 million penalty Siemens paid to the DOJ
but wholly ignores the $350 million that Siemens had to disgorge to the SEC,
which wipes out the supposed 67% discount on the FCPA civil fine. Nor does the
DOJ figure factor in the $856 million Siemens had to pay to the office of the
Berlin prosecutor as part of the plea arrangement worked out by all the different
governments' agencies. Indeed, for all of its plaudits on Siemens' admirable
cooperation, the Justice Department actually increased Siemens' Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines Offense Level by two notches for "'significant conduct outside
[the] United States."' 0 2 So Siemens spent more than $1 billion on its internal
audit-to perform the government's investigation-and was rewarded with having
to pay only about $1.7 billion in fines and disgorged profits. Maybe not such a
great deal after all.
I fear that Siemens might not have expended such riches and laid itself bare if it
had understood in advance that it had so little to gain from its extraordinary
cooperation. The federal government's treatment of Siemens constitutes a caution-
ary tale for future corporate executives weighing the "benefits" of voluntarily
98. See id. at 213.
99. Id.; Yockey, supra note 4, at 824 n.200.
100. Yockey, supra note 4, at 825 n.207.
101. Tarun & Tomczak, supra note 23, at 224.
102. Id. at 224 (quoting Sentencing Memorandum, United States v. Siemens AG, No. 08-CR-367 (D.D.C.
Dec. 12, 2008)).
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disclosing potential FCPA violations. In the wake of Siemens, corporate legal
advisors could perhaps be forgiven for advising their clients that the rewards for
airing their dirty laundry before the DOJ do not outweigh the risk of nevertheless
suffering onerous penalties.103 We cannot assess the full price for the DOJ's
policy because any internal corruption that corporate management discovers
and terminates-but does not disclose-will, by its nature, remain unknown. The
situation is much the same with respect to the DOJ's other recent mega-fine
FCPA cases-Daimler,10 4 Kellogg, Brown & Root, 0 5 and BAE Systems.10 6
Despite what DOJ lauded as Daimler's "excellent" internal investigation covering
"dozens" of countries and costing tens of millions of dollars, 0 7 the discount on
Daimler's FCPA fine, just like Siemens's, was erased by the funds Daimler had to
disgorge.'0o I doubt that any dissatisfaction on the part of these firms' executives
and directors with their treatment by the DOJ was assuaged by the recognition
that, insofar as the government could have imposed both the full fine and full
disgorgement, the imposition of any fine less than the highest amount allowed by
law could arguably be considered a DOJ "discount" for good behavior. Despite the
extraordinary voluntary disclosures and exemplary cooperation of these four
companies, three of them were nevertheless hit with fines that were within the
range of their respective United States Sentencing Guidelines for their crimes.109 I
would never minimize the harms inflicted by corruption, nor am I an apologist for
Siemens, Daimler, or any other corporate defendant. Instead, my point is simply
that this is not a viable incentive structure.
VI. DOJ's INCENTIVE STRUCTURE FOR SELF-REPORTING FCPA VIOLATIONS
Is DOOMED To FAIL
Let us consider the two elephants in the FCPA enforcement room. First, it is
beyond cavil that the Justice Department and the SEC cannot accomplish this
level of FCPA enforcement with their own resources. They simply do not have a
billion dollars to spend investigating a company for FCPA violations in thirty-four
different countries. Without self-disclosure, much-and more likely most-of this
corruption would never have been discovered, punished, and remedied. Second, it
is equally beyond dispute that voluntary disclosure is what fuels FCPA enforce-
103. It is important to note that the enormous financial penalties were counterbalanced to some extent by the
fact that Siemens was spared one of the most severe punishments available under the FCPA-Siemens was not
debarred from doing business with the United States government. The role of debarment under the FCPA is
discussed further in the next section below.
104. Tarun & Tomczak, supra note 23, at 227-28, 233.
105. Yockey, supra note 4, at 791; Tarun & Tomczak, supra note 23, at 225.
106. Tarun & Tomczak, supra note 23, at 226.
107. Id. at 214, 228.
108. Id. at 235.
109. See id. at 224-25.
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ment."o And an enforcement regime that depends on voluntary disclosure of
violations itself depends, in turn, on transparent, predictable and reliable benefits
for the corporation. "The four FCPA mega-settlements, along with the substantial
tangible and intangible costs of global internal investigations, may lead other
boards of directors to conclude"-as a rational business judgment-"that the
uncertain benefits of voluntary disclosures, global investigations and continuing
cooperation are outweighed by the enormous costs to the corporation and its
shareholders. Corporations and their decision-makers should be able to expect a
coordinated, transparent fine and sanction policy from the United States govern-
ment."11
Given (1) that rigorous enforcement of the FCPA advances the economic
(not to mention moral) development of impoverished nations, combats terrorism
and tyranny, and promotes the rule of law, and (2) that only the large global
corporations themselves have the resources and expertise to police their global
operations, they should be harnessed to the FCPA's plough. The horse pulling the
plough simply needs to be offered the right carrot. I propose two carrots. First, if a
corporation establishes a comprehensive, fully funded, adequately staffed and
trained FCPA compliance program, then the rogue employee who circumvents it
and violates the FCPA-and is caught and turned over to the authorities by his
employer-should be deemed to be acting outside the realm of his corporate
responsibilities' 1 2 and the self-reporting corporation should not be held criminally
liable for his misconduct. This would be an instance of a blameless corporation. 13
For this incentive to work, of course, the carrot must be large and appetizing-
hence the absolute necessity for transparency and predictability in FCPA enforce-
ment.
110. Senate FCPA Hearing, supra note 1, at 78 (testimony of Michael Volkov).
11l. Tarun & Tomczak, supra note 23, at 235. There is nothing novel in this model of corporate decision-
making. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of
Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 687, 728-29 (1997); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Optimal
Law Enforcement With Self-Reporting of Behavior, 102 J. POL. ECON. 583, 583-84 (1994); Robert W. Tarun &
Peter P. Tomczak, A Brief Comment on Placing the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act on the Tracks in the Race for
Amnesty, 90 Tax. L. REv. 183, 183-84 (2012); see also Stephen A. Fraser, Placing the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act on the Tracks in the Race for Amnesty, 90 TEX. L. REv. 1009, 1022-23 (2012) ("Companies now question
whether to cooperate in an investigation or to decline to report violative conduct. As such, practitioners have
recognized that the value of these uncertain incentives may not outweigh the cost to shareholders and business
reputation that self-disclosure of FCPA violations would entail. For some, this uncertainty appears to have created
frustrations in counseling clients about their options upon discovery of conduct violative of the FCPA. Indeed,
some advise their clients that there is no certain benefit to self-reporting this conduct, suggesting that the divide
between the Fraud Section's meaningful-credit model and the bar's advice to FCPA clients is wide. This gap may
be so severe that companies decline to report their conduct to the DOJ, despite the costs associated with this
course, and may not receive contrary advice from their counsel. There is also good reason to believe that, in fact,
conduct violative of the FCPA occurs and is unreported. Indeed, this may be a perfectly rational outcome.").
112. See Thompson, The Blameless Corporation, supra note 39, at 1254.
113. See id. at 1252-53; see also Thompson, Keynote Speech: The Reality of Overcriminalization, supra
note 33, at 577-78.
216 [Vol. 51:199
2014] FCPA ENFORCEMENT CONSIDERATIONS 217
The second carrot is that a genuinely cooperative, self-reporting company
with a proper compliance program must be assured that it will not be debarred
from contracting with the United States government or receiving the govern-
ment permits required to run its operations. True, debarment has thus far not been
employed as a sanction under the FCPA, 1 14 but it could be. The sanction is
provided for under current law,'" 5 and the U.S. government needs to make it clear
to the world's corporations that it does not consider any corporation "too big" or
"too important" to debar. If, instead of dangling the unspoken threat of debarment
over government contractors as a sword of Damocles, the government expressly
offered forbearance on this sanction in return for eager and effective corporate
self-policing and self-reporting, it could be a very enticing carrot indeed, as
decades of experience with Defense Department contractors have shown.' 16
Proposing detailed guidelines for what constitutes an acceptable compliance
114. Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 10, at 776-78.
115. See 48 C.F.R. §§ 9.406-2, 9.407-2 (2012); see also FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 52, at 70,
118 n.363 (discussing debarment regulations).
116. Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 10, at 777 & nn.5-6. Although we cannot tell whether debarment
was part of the settlement negotiations between the Justice Department and Siemens in the global corruption
scandal discussed in the previous section of this article, it is apparent that the DOJ, at the very least, unilaterally
took Siemens's potential debarment into account when calculating the sanctions. See Department's Sentencing
Memorandum at 11, United States v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, No. 1:08-cr-00367-RJL (D.D.C. Dec. 12,
2008). Although the DOJ did not explicitly promise that Siemens would not be debarred due to its FCPA
violations, the DOJ's Sentencing Memorandum did note that DOJ had considered the risk of debarment as part of
its computation of the sanctions. Id. The Justice Department specifically noted that one of the considerations that
it took into account in its disposition of the case (along with its consideration of such mitigating factors as
Siemens's extraordinary cooperation in the investigation) was the DOJ's "analysis of collateral consequences
includ[ing] the consideration of the risk of debarment and exclusion from government contracts." Id. Thus, the
DOJ used the risk of debarment as a justification for not making its punishment of Siemens tougher-and perhaps
it also sent a not-too-subtle message to Siemens that debarment remained a possibility if Siemens's internal
reforms failed to live up to the DOJ's expectations.
My strong suggestion is that the federal government bring this consideration to the surface and expressly
include debarment as part of the negotiation process when it seeks to settle an FCPA prosecution of a corporation.
It is beyond cavil that debarment is of vital-perhaps even paramount-importance to FCPA defendants such as
Siemens. In that very case it was subsequently reported that "three years after Siemens AG reached a record
foreign-bribery settlement with U.S. authorities, the German industrial conglomerate is capitalizing on business
from an unexpected place-the U.S. government.. . . Siemens today isn't just benefitting from its ongoing
business with the government. It's made capturing more business and influence in Washington a central part of its
U.S. strategy." Vanessa Fuhrmans, Shrugging Off Bribery Case, Siemens Gains Favor in U.S., WALL ST. J.
(Dec. 15, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 10001424052970203893404577098632947522176.html.
Thus, one could speculate that Siemens is trying to make itself into a contractor that the U.S. government
cannot live without, thereby gaining a degree of immunity from any imposition in the future of the ultimate FCPA
sanction of debarment. Rather than making corporations worry unnecessarily about debarment, leaving the threat
unspoken and encouraging corporations to entwine themselves with government contracts as a hedge against
future debarment, or leaving policy-makers and the public in the dark about the role of the sanction in the DOJ's
settlement of FCPA prosecutions, I believe the better course would be to (1) remind corporations that debarment is
part of the statutory arsenal for punishing FCPA defendants, (2) announce that no global corporation is too big or
too important to be debarred, (3) make debarment an explicit and high-profile bargaining chip in settlement
negotiations with FCPA defendants, and (4) expressly write into FCPA settlements that debarment will ensue if
the defendant does not faithfully and vigorously reform itself.
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program or sufficiently cooperative corporate self-reporting is beyond the scope
of this article. There is no shortage of proposals worth considering, from those
of Judge Sporkin briefly discussed above, to those of Robert Tarun, one of the
leaders of the white collar defense bar who outlined some interesting ideas in
the pages of this journal just two years ago.'" 7 I do believe, however, that any
compliance guidance must specifically address the problems of recidivism and of
recently acquired subsidiaries. First, if a company has a seemingly adequate
compliance program but is now self-disclosing FCPA violations for a third time,
then it is apparent that it has not tried hard enough to eradicate its problem, and
the corporation probably deserves to be closely examined. Second, when a U.S.
company acquires a subsidiary, there is rarely time to perform full due diligence
under the FCPA prior to closing the deal. Therefore, I support adoption of a rule
that a company should be given a reasonable period of time to conduct a diligent
audit of its new foreign subsidiary and that, if it uncovers and self-reports FCPA
violations, the parent company should not be subject to criminal liability for the
prior sins of its subsidiary." 8
VII. HARNESSING CORPORATIONS To ENFORCE THE FCPA IS BUT ANOTHER
INSTANCE OF THE LONG HISTORY OF REQUIRING CORPORATIONS
To SHOULDER PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITIES
Some will no doubt criticize what I am proposing as inappropriate (and in-
effective) "outsourcing" of FCPA enforcement to the very companies that are
the subject of the statute. Such an objection has a certain facile appeal, but I believe
it misapprehends the essential nature and purpose of the corporate entity itself.
What I am proposing is not that we "outsource" FCPA enforcement to corpora-
tions, but rather that we motivate corporations to "in-source" the policing and
reporting of bribery and related misconduct by their employees and agents-which
ought to be their responsibility in the first place. As creatures of the law-artificial
persons that exist "only in intendment and consideration of the law," as Lord Coke
put it 19-corporations are obliged to conduct themselves as we command and to
undertake the responsibilities we choose to impose upon them-including the duty
to rigorously and vigilantly police their own behavior.
This is one of those instances where Holmes' dictum that a page of history is
117. See Tarun & Tomczak, supra note 23.
118. See House FCPA Hearing, supra note 58, at 38 (testimony of George J. Terwilliger) ("I believe it is
worthy to consider providing by statute a post-closing period of repose for companies involved in acquisitions
during which they would be shielded from FCPA enforcement while undertaking a review of FCPA compliance in
the acquired business and undertaking steps to remediate potential FCPA issues that are discovered as a result of
that review. Providing that an acquiring company would have a period of time from the date of acquisition to
conduct a thorough assessment, remediate existing misconduct and impose its compliance policies upon the
acquired company is consistent with the core objectives of FCPA enforcement and presents no hazard to the
fundamental objectives of the statute itself.").
119. See The Case of Sutton's Hospital, (1612) 77 Eng. Rep. 960, (K.B.) 973.
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worth a volume of logic applies with full force. Since its inception in Roman law
two millennia ago, the corporation has been understood as a legal entity licensed
by the state to further public purposes.12 0 Whether chartered by an English king
to explore and settle a distant continent or by an American state to build a canal
or a railroad, a corporation was a means by which the sovereign enlisted private
capital and expertise to achieve public ends.12 1 My thesis is that, from its earliest
historical origins-or, as Blackstone would put it, from "time whereof the memory
of man runneth not to the contrary"l 22-Corporations have been understood as
more than purely private commercial enterprises with the sole purpose of maxi-
mizing their own profits. They are instead artificial bodies existing only in public
law, organizations born of the broader community that owe responsibilities to
that community. Throughout history, corporations have been charged by the states
that chartered them with responsibilities that we would commonly assume to be
governmental functions, such as tax collection, provision of public works and
services, financing the public debt, providing diplomatic representation for the
sovereign to foreign nations (at the corporation's expense) and even mounting
military expeditions or providing law enforcement services.12 3
If such core state obligations can be-and historically have been-successfully
imposed upon and fulfilled by private corporations, surely the enforcement of
the FCPA can be accomplished by imposing on U.S. multinational corporations the
"public" responsibility to self-police and self-report FCPA violations. If the public
and commercial spheres could once be so easily mingled under the umbrella of the
international corporate form during the age of empires, they can now just as easily
be disentangled-and the bribery and baksheesh that now corrupt public services
can be restrained by the very same corporate mechanism that once so successfully
conjoined commerce and government. Times change and the needs of the public
change; the corporation, which is but the creature of public will, can be adjusted
accordingly.
120. See, e.g., I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 455-62 (facsimile of the Ist
ed., The University of Chicago Press 1979) (1765); 2 FERNAND BRAUDEL, THE WHEELS OF COMMERCE:
CIVILIZATION AND CAPFrALISM 15TH-18TH CENTURY 440 (Sian Reynolds trans., Harper & Row 1982) (1979);
NATHAN ROSENBERG & L. E. BIRDZELL, JR., HOW THE WEST GREW RICH: THE ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION OF THE
INDUSTRIAL WORLD 194 (1986); Douglas Arner, Development of the American Law of Corporations to 1832,
55 S.M.U L. REv. 23,25 & nn.9-11(2002); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Cyclical Transformations of the Corporate
Form: A Historical Perspective on Corporate Social Responsibility, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 767, 773-74 (2005).
121. The history of this subject, and its ramifications for modem corporation law, are explored in my
forthcoming article. See Larry D. Thompson, The Responsible Corporation (2013) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author).
122. BLACKSTONE, supra note 120, at 460-61.
123. See BRAUDEL, supra note 120, at 440; JONATHAN BARRON BASKIN & PAUL J. MIRANTI, JR., A HISTORY OF
CORPORATE FINANCE 58-60 (1997); JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE COMPANY- A SHorT
HISTORY OF A REVOLUTIONARY IDEA 4-5, 17 (Modem Library ed., 2003); ROSENBERG & BIRDZELL, supra note 120,
at 193; DIG. 3.4.1.pr. (Gaius, Provincial Edict 3) (Alan Watson trans., 1985), quoted in Avi-Yonah, supra note 120,
at 773-74.
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Multinational corporations enjoy the same vast resources and the same global
reach now as they did two centuries ago. That is why Siemens can spend a billion
dollars to investigate and root out corruption in thirty-four countries when the
Justice Department cannot. Just as in the eighteenth century, in the twenty-first
the corporate form can be employed to serve the public's interests-particularly
where those interests involve inducing the corporate "empire" to police itself in
exchange for the promise of avoiding ruinous criminal liability. The privilege of
modem multinational giants to be free of the risk of criminal liability under the
FCPA can and should be conditioned on their willingness to implement the law in
accordance with clear and predictable guidance, and on the effectiveness of that
implementation.
I believe that, if provided with sufficiently transparent standards of conduct and
sufficiently reliable benefits from rigorously policing their own behavior and
conforming it to the FCPA-and exposing wrongdoing when they discover that
some employee or subsidiary has violated the FCPA-the enlightened self-interest
of corporations will furnish the will, and the resources, for effective enforcement
of the FCPA. My confidence in this belief is fortified by the success of "in-
sourcing" law enforcement responsibilities by other federal agencies.
VII. IN-SOURCING REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT WORKS FOR OTHER
FEDERAL AGENCIES
A. The Department of Defense
In 1986, the Packard Commissionl2 4 reported a lack of confidence in the
nation's defense contractors and concluded that "no conceivable number of
additional federal auditors, inspectors, investigators, and prosecutors can police
[government procurement] fully, much less make it work more effectively. Nor
have criminal sanctions historically proved to be a reliable tool for ensuring
contractor compliance." 2 5 Therefore the Commission proposed putting the onus
on the contractors to ensure compliance and to take prompt remedial action and
make immediate disclosure to the Defense Department ("DOD") when violations
of contracting regulations occurred. 12 6
The Defense Department's disclosure program has been in operation for three
decades, fueled by the presumption that there will be no debarment and no criminal
prosecution of a corporation whose compliance and self-disclosure programs
have met guidelines issued by the DOD. Those guidelines include a model
agreement that the DOD enters into with cooperating companies, and provide a
level of clarity and predictability of which companies contending with the FCPA
124. Formally known as the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management.
125. John Bryan Warnock, Principled or Practical Responsibility: Sixty Years of Discussion, 41 PUB. CoNT.
L. J. 881, 888 & n.52 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
126. Id. at 888.
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can only dream. 1 2 7 The DOD policy does not constitute an outright amnesty: the
government may still prosecute violators, and other penalties (such as civil fines)
remain available where the government deems them warranted. Although far from
perfect, the DOD policy has worked remarkably well in promoting self-policed
corporate compliance. 1 2 8 Most defense contractors have established detailed codes
of conduct, provided confidential hotlines for employees to blow the whistle on
violations, and recruited and trained adequate networks of compliance officers. 129
B. The Environmental Protection Agency
Much of what the DOD learned about the benefits and means for self-policing
has migrated to the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") and formed the
basis of its Audit Policy, formally entitled "Incentives for Self-Policing: Discov-
ery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of Violations." 30 Civil penalties based
on the gravity or severity of the spill or other environmental violation will be
waived by the EPA if all nine of the Audit Policy's conditions are met. These
conditions principally involve the company's voluntary discovery, prompt disclo-
sure, expeditious correction or remediation, and the implementation of appropriate
127. See Fraser, supra note 111, at 1031.
128. See id. at 1031-32.
129. W. Jay DeVecchio & Devon Engel, EPA Suspension, Debarment, and Listing: What EPA Contractors Can
Learn From the Defense Industry (and Vice Versa), 22 PUB. CONT. L. J. 55, 63-64 (1992). The DOD policy
appears to be in the process of moving from one of inducing voluntary adoption of these corporate compliance
programs to mandating that companies adopt such programs. U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-591,
DEFENSE CONTRACTING INTEGRITY: OPPORTUNITIES ExIST TO IMPROVE DOD's OVERSIGHT OF CONTRACTOR ETmcs
PROGRAMS (2009), http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-591 ("Until recently, ethics programs and practices of
defense contractors were self-policed. Given the significant sums spent to acquire goods and services, the Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) was amended twice starting in December 2007 to first mandate and later amplify
contractor ethics program rules. Before FAR changes were finalized in December 2008, Congress required
GAO to report in 2009 on the ethics programs of major defense contractors. This report (1) describes the extent
that contractors had ethics programs before the finalization of the FAR rules that included practices consistent
with standards now required by the FAR and (2) assesses the impact the new FAR rules have on Department of
Defense (DOD) oversight of contractor ethics programs.") (discussing the highlights of the report in the pages
before the actual report begins); see, e.g., Glen H. Sturtevant, New DoD Rule Makes Contractors Responsible for
Compliance with Revolving-door Laws, LEXOLOGY (Feb. 24, 2012), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.
aspx?g=b053c5a3-accd-4aOb-9805-44a796d5cOb2 ("The Department of Defense (DoD) has issued a final rule
requiring defense contractors bidding for contracts to represent that certain former DoD officials employed by the
contractor are in compliance with post-employment restrictions, known as federal revolving-door laws.");
Contractor Disclosure Program, U.S. DEPARTMENT DEF, OFF. INSPECTOR GEN., http://www.dodig.milprograms/
CD/index.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2013) ("National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal Year 2012,
Section 818, requires Defense contractors report suspected electronic counterfeit parts or non-conforming parts to
the government. Contractors should report through the submission of a contractor disclosure. All other reporting
requirements remain in effect, to include entry into the Government-Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP)
database, or similar programs."); see also 48 C.F.R. §§ 3.1003, 52.203-13 (2012) (discussing contractor code of
business ethics and conduct).
130. Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of Violations, 65 Fed.
Reg. 19618 (Apr. 11, 2000).
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measures to prevent recurrence of the violation.'13 Furthermore, there will be no
recommendation for criminal prosecution of entities that disclose their criminal
violations and meet all the other standards. 13 2
C. The Department of Energy
Operators of nuclear facilities can have one hundred percent of their potential
penalties mitigated if they disclose their own violations of worker safety, nuclear
131. Id. at 19625-26.
132. Id. at 19625. There have been recent stirrings within the EPA to consider defunding its audit policy in
reaction to federal budget cutbacks, as revealed in the draft "Program Manager Guidance" that the EPA circulated
to its regional offices in 2012:
Audit Policy/Self-Disclosures: The EPA Regions should consult with Headquarters before
initiating any new work in response to self-disclosures. For FY 2013, the Audit Policy/Self
Disclosure program is one of the areas where OECA will reduce its program work to a minimal
national presence. OECA is working with the Regions to develop a plan for reducing work in this
area to a level of minimal national coverage. Although the Audit Policy/Self-Disclosure program
has yielded a significant number of annual disclosures, the environmental benefit from those
disclosures is estimated to be significantly less than from traditional enforcement, and the
disclosures have generally not focused on the highest priority areas.
U.S. ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT & COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, FY 2013 OFFICE OF ENFORCE-
MENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE (OECA) DRAFT NATIONAL PROGRAM MANAGER (NPM) GUIDANCE 14 (2012),
available at http://news.agc.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/04/FY13_OECA_DraftNPMGdnce.pdf; see also EPA
Plans To Cut Back Self-Disclosure Program; AGC Solicits Member Input, ASSOCIATED GEN. CONTRACTORS AM.
(April 24, 2012), http://news.agc.org/2012/04/24/epa-plans-to-cut-back-self-disclosure-program-agc-solicits-
member-input/.
Following a comment period for the EPA Regions, states, and tribes, OECA released its final
programmatic guidance on April 24, 2012, with a modest change in tone. OECA now acknowl-
edges that the Audit Policy helped EPA increase its understanding of environmental compliance,
and that internal reviews of compliance have become more widely adopted by the regulated
community, as part of good management.
Jean-Cyril Walker, Future of EPA's Audit Program Remains Regretfully Uncertain, 21 WASH. LEGAL FOUND.,
no. 11, May 25, 2012, at 1, 2, available at http://www.wlf.org/publishing/publicationdetail.asp?id=2317
(internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, although the EPA has, as of July 1, 2013, decommissioned its web-based
system that once allowed companies to electronically self-disclose certain violations, see Auditing, U.S. ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/compliance/incentives/auditing/index.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2013),
its long-standing self-disclosure incentive program otherwise remains in place. See EPA's Audit Policy, U.S.
ENvTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov.compliance/incentives/auditing/auditpolicy.html (last visited
Nov. 25, 2013); see generally U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT & COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE,
FY 2014 OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, NAIONAL PROGRAM MANAGER GUIDANCE 14
(2013), available at http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/fyl4oecanpmguidance.pdf.
Although the disclosure policy survived that particular threat, even the EPA's mere consideration of the option
of cutting back on the self-disclosure program strikes me as rather counter-intuitive: one would think that if a tight
budget reduces a government agency's enforcement resources, increased, rather than decreased, reliance on
corporate self-policing and self-disclosure would be the sensible response. In any event, if the EPA ultimately
finds its self-disclosure policy not to be cost-effective, its learning and experience should of course be folded into
the ongoing conversation on this subject. But it would not change my fundamental conviction that it is absolutely
essential to incentivize corporations to self-police and to self-disclose.
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safety, and classified information security.13 3 The General Accounting Office has
found that the system works remarkably well: over a ten-year period, voluntary
self-reports of violations exceeded the Energy Department's own violation notices
and enforcement letters by a factor of eighteen to one. 1 3 4
D. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") has also adopted a self-
policing incentive program as part of its enforcement regime for regulating the
market in electricity transmission. A company that self-reports a violation of
FERC regulations can garner up to one hundred percent mitigation of the other-
wise applicable civil penalty.13 5 Like the Department of Energy, FERC's self-
policing and self-reporting policy generates more compliance than the agency's
own inspections. In 2009, there were 122 self-disclosures compared to just ten
FERC investigations. 1 3 6
VIII. CONCLUSION
All of this indicates a genuine basis for optimism that FCPA enforcement can
likewise be in-sourced to corporations. Throughout history, corporations have
been created at the sufferance of the state to serve the public's interests. We should
expect no less from modern multinational corporations, and with the proper
incentive structure I believe that we can motivate corporations to in-source FCPA
compliance and thereby advance the noble ends of that statute while conserving
untold billions in taxpayer resources that can then be devoted to other pressing
public needs.
Indeed, the campaign against bribery will pay more dividends if we look to our
own resources-including the corporate resources we can conscript through the
incentives described in this article-than if we were to rely solely on foreign
governments. To be sure, the OECD Convention has been ratified by more than
three dozen nations, but if the governmental resources of the richest nation on the
planet are insufficient to the task of ferreting out corruption in that nation's own
chartered companies, it follows a fortiori that less wealthy nations will be even
more overwhelmed. And that assumes that all (or even most) foreign nations
actually want to reduce corruption-a dubious proposition at best. Providing
law-enforcement assistance directly to foreign nations is not the most effective
means of enhancing global anti-corruption enforcement. In a single five-year
period-1993 through 1998-the U.S. provided nearly a billion dollars in "rule of
133. Sarah L. Stafford, Outsourcing Enforcement: Principles to Guide Self-Policing Regimes, 32 CARDOzo L.
REv. 2293, 2315 (2011).
134. Id. at 2316.
135. Id. at 2318.
136. Id. at 2318-19.
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law assistance" to countries throughout the world.' 37 The inherent shortcoming of
that approach is evident from its very title: it is very, very difficult to enhance the
rule of law, no matter how lavishly one hands out grants, in nations that simply do
not have the will to clean up corruption and follow the rule of law. It is little
wonder that the first two national efforts to curb bribery in international commerce
came from the two nations-America and Great Britain-with the longest tradi-
tions of the rule of law.
Ginning up enthusiasm for wiping out corruption in the world's kleptocracies is
no mean feat when the kleptocrats remain in control. If America is serious about
combatting global corruption in commerce, we must expect to shoulder most of the
weight, but I believe that we can incentivize our corporations to bear some of that
burden for us.
137. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-01-629, INTERNATIONAL CRIME CONTROL: SUSTAINED EXECUTIVE-LEVEL
COORDINATION OF FEDERAL RESPONSE NEEDED 6 (2001), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/240/232712.pdf.
Some thirty-five federal entities have been involved in these programs, including seven cabinet departments and
twenty-eight related agencies, bureaus and offices. Id.
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